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Till the end of the 20th century it was a large problem of the international criminal 
jurisdiction that a sufficient judicial body did not exist which could operate permanently 
and efficiently for the aim of repressing and preventing the most serious crimes of an 
international character such as war crimes or crimes against humanity. In 1998 a great step 
was taken with the birth of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which 
will proceed in the case of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity conducted in 
armed conflicts. 
 
After this event the European Parliament adopted resolutions to encourage states (and 
before all the member states of the Union) to ratify the Statute so that it could enter into 
force earlier. Greece was the latest member state which ratified it on the 15 May 2002. 
Although all of them were members of the Rome Statute as well, a lot of dominant 
countries had not ratified it. In the Council Common Positions related to the issue of the 
ICC can be found the common aim of supporting the widest possible ratification.  In these 
documents the Council requested the member states to make every effort to further this 
process in negotiations or political dialogues with third states, groups of states or relevant 
regional organisations.2 The Union’s opinion is reflected in these provisions that universal 
accession to the Rome Statute is essential for the full effectiveness of the Court. This 
position is totally against any special international agreement which could undermine the 
integrity of the Statute. 
 
The United States of America endeavours to conclude such kind of special agreements as 
many as possible. Although on the 31 December 2000 U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer 
signed the Rome Statute on behalf of the U.S. government during the Clinton 
administration, on the 6 May 2002 the Bush administration revoked the signature. The 
main reason of this act was the fear that the ICC could be a forum for politically motivated 
prosecutions. The settings of the European Parliament were loud of disapproval full of the 
strongest terms related to this step of the US.3  
 
Beyond that the US denied to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC its main aim was to 
ensure the immunity of the American nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court. To 
reach this goal they try to conclude bilateral impunity agreements (BIAs) with as many 
states as possible. In the text of the agreement is declared that the government wants to 
ensure the impunity of officials, employees, military personnel, or other nationals of US 
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committed the international crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC.4 Any state 
becoming a contracting party is obliged to surrender all of the affected persons present in 
its territory to the authorities of the United States instead of the Court after the provisions 
of BIA: 
 
“1. For purposes of this agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees 
(including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party. 
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the expressed consent of the first 
Party, 
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to the International Criminal Court for any purpose, or 
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third 
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to the International Criminal Court. 
3. When the United States extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the other Party to a 
third country, the United States will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person to the International 
Criminal Court by the third country, absent the expressed consent of the Government of X. 
4. When the Government of X extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the United States 
of America to a third country, the Government of X will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that 
person to the International Criminal Court by a third country, absent the expressed consent of the 
Government of the United States.”5 
 
These obligations of the contracting states make sure that none of the nationals of the US 
will be brought to the Court but on the other hand the agreement does not mention any 
obligation which would ensure the punishment of persons conducting the most serious 
crimes of an international character. It does not declare any obligation of the national 
authorities of the Parties to proceed in the cases of the affected nationals after that they 
were taken home. On this way US nationals would be returned automatically to the United 
States, without the need of any formal request of extradition from the competent judicial 
authorities. In a memorandum of Parliamentarians for Global Action is mentioned an 
example which illustrates the absurd situation well: if Italy signed the bilateral agreement, 
this could lead to the following situation: if a US national steals a car in Rome, he runs the 
risk to be tried and punished under the law of Italy, but if a US national perpetrates a crime 
against humanity, he shall automatically be returned to the country of nationality.6 It shows 
that the real aim of these agreements is not to protect the national jurisdiction but to avoid 
the procedure of the ICC and to undermine its integrity. Beyond that must be mentioned 
that the bilateral agreements declare that US will investigate and prosecute people accused 
of the affected crimes only where appropriate. As US national law does not include many 
of the crimes listed in the Rome Statute, this may be interpreted as a situation where 
investigation and prosecution is not appropriate.7 Genocide is codified by US internal law 
but in case of this crime may proceed US courts only if it is committed in the United States 
or the offender is a US national (this category does not include the officials without 
American nationality). Crimes against humanity are not codified at all in the United States.8 
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After examining this legal background can be clearly outlined the intent behind the BIAs. 
This is contrary to the overall purpose of the ICC, which is to ensure the proceeding in 
case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes  either at the national level or 
before the ICC. 
The opinion of the European Union related to BIAs was clearly declared immediately after 
the first requests of the Government of US for concluding such agreements. The European 
Parliament stated in its resolutions that no special agreement may ever make possible the 
impunity of any individual accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. 
After its opinion ratifying such an agreement is incompatible with the membership of the 
EU.9  
 
A Council Common Position of 2003 declares the aim of EU to hinder the conclusion of 
such agreements: 
 
“(5) The serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are of concern to all Member States, which are 
determined to co-operate for the prevention of those crimes and for putting an end to the impunity of the 
perpetrators thereof. 
(6) The principles and rules of international criminal law embodied in the Rome Statute should be taken 
into account in other international legal instruments.”10   
 
These provisions furnish an explicit official position and a clear message to the member 
states about their requested attitude to this issue and although all of the member states 
publicly refused to conclude a BIA11, the question can be still posed: are the resolutions 
enacted by the organs of the Union and the public affirmations strong enough to prevent 
the member states to conclude such agreements? One negative example can be Romania as 
a candidate state for EU membership, although ratified the Rome Statute in April 2002, 
became the first state signing an immunity agreement with the United States in August 
2002. The European Council’s reaction to this act was consistent to the above mentioned 
EU resolutions as it requested Romania to align its Common Position related to the ICC.12  
 
On 30 September 2002 the EU foreign ministers met in Brussels where they adopted their 
decision on BIAs. This resolution of the Council of the EU includes an annex about the 
EU guiding principles concerning the impunity agreements. After them any solution should 
include appropriate operative provisions ensuring that the accused persons do not enjoy 
impunity. These provisions should ensure appropriate investigation and prosecution by 
national jurisdictions but only “where there is sufficient evidence”.13 This condition can be 
interpreted in many ways which finally can become the ground of denying the procedure. 
Actually this part of the sentence gives to the US complete political discretion whether to 
investigate or prosecute the worst possible crimes. It would be necessary for the EU to 
make clear for the member states that there is no way to avoid proceeding nor on the 
ground of such an interpretation. 
                                                          
9 European Parliament opinion or resolution. 24 October 2002 RSP/2002/2592 
wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/oeil/oeil.Res112 Date of downl.: 10 February 2004 
10 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP on the International Criminal Court. 16 June 2003. Official 
Journal L 150, 18/06/2003 P. 0067-0069. Art (5)-(6) 
11 Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Breakdown of Countries. 26 November 2003. 
www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/BIAWaiversWICC24Nov03.pdf Date of downl.:                4 
February 2004 
12 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP on the International Criminal Court. 16 June 2003. Official 
Journal L 150, 18/06/2003 P. 0067-0069. Art 9(2) 
13 Council of the EU: EU Guiding Principles concerning Arrangements between a State Party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the United States regarding the conditions to surrender of 
persons to the Court. 30 September 2002 12386/02 COJUR 9 USA 35 PESC 369  
Miskolc Journal of International Law                                                                                       Eszter Kirs: 
Reflection of the European Union to the US Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
www.mjil.hu - 22 - 
 
The other strict opinion which is declared in the Guiding principles is that “entering into 
US agreements would be inconsistent with ICC States Parties’ obligations with regard to 
the ICC Statute”.14 Why would it violate the rules of the Statute? The US government 
drafted the text of bilateral agreement bearing in mind the Article 98(2) of the Statute. 
After their explanation this provision enables them to conclude such agreements. The text 
of this critical Article sounds that: 
 
“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending 
State is required to surrender a person of the State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the co-
operation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.”15 
 
Delegates involved in the negotiations about this Article 98 indicate that this provision is 
not intended to allow the conclusion of new agreements but to prevent legal conflicts which 
can arise because of existing agreements. They consider that some states had previously 
special agreements such as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which obliged them to 
send the nationals of another country (the “sending State”) back home when a crime had 
allegedly been committed.16 Although the earlier mentioned EU Guiding principles related 
to this subject declares the intent to prevent the conclusion of bilateral agreements but 
related to the interpretation of this problematic Article it does not include any clear official 
position. It says: “Any solution should cover only persons present on the territory of a requested State 
because they have been sent by a sending State, cf. Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute.”17 The 
expression of “sending State” can have a wide interpretation. It is essentially important to 
clear that it means only the sending state after SOFAs or such kind of special existing 
agreements with the aim of ensuring the sufficient legal ground for refusing the US 
requests related to BIAs. 
 
Beyond this problem it would cause further violations of the provisions of the Rome 
Statute as well. If a State Party concludes bilateral agreement providing impunity also for 
their nationals in case of crimes listed in the Statute which is contrary to the main aim of it. 
After reciprocity BIAs ensure that also the US will not surrender the nationals of the other 
Party. It is clear that if the other State is a Party to the Rome Statute it violates its 
obligations declared in the Statute. Actually the scope of persons covered by the BIAs is 
too broad. The Article 98(2) can be applied only for those persons “sent” by the US in a 
military manner and not for all US nationals. These agreements would give special 
privileges for persons only on a national ground, so this would breach the fundamental 
principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law. The Rome Statute includes 
also a provision about the general obligation of the Parties to co-operate with the Court in 
its investigation and prosecution which would be violated as well.18 Beyond the provisions 
of the Statute concluding BIA would breach also the Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties which obliges the states parties to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.19 This rule is the ground of a very interesting 
question: after that US government had signed the Rome Statute which already obliges it 
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16 Coalition for the International Criminal Court: U.S. bilateral immunity or so-called „Article 98” agreements. 
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not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, is it possible to behave in a totally 
inconsistent way after “unsigning”? 
It has been reported on numerous occasions that when countries sign a bilateraly 
agreement, the US has simultaneously announced the provision of large financial packages 
to those countries and on the other hand in many cases of countries not concluding or 
publicly refusing to conclude BIA the United States denied financial aid.20 In May 2002 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman explained the US policy toward the 
ICC saying that, “the United States respects the decision of those nations who have chosen to join the 
ICC; but they in turn must respect our decision not to join the ICC or place our citizens under the 
jurisdiction of the court.”.21 To tell the truth the strong economical and political pressure which 
the US uses cannot be mentioned as a sign of respect regarding to decision of the other 
sovereign state at all. 
 
The largest danger of BIA is that it can become a precedent and it may encourage other 
nations, particularly those opposed to the Court, to pursue similar immunity for their own 
citizens. This would fundamentally undermine the activity of the ICC. On the other hand 
many governments, non-governmental organizations and other international law experts 
argue against the bilateral agreements. Amnesty International’s one million members 
around the world, along with the more that one thousand members of the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, are campaigning to prevent all states to sign such 
agreements.22 Till now 70 states have signed BIAs but only 13 have ratified them and 
already 45 countries have publicly refused signing (including all of the member states of the 
European Union as mentioned earlier).23 Only in this way of a world-wide refusal of 
conclusion of bilateral immunity agreements can be ensured the integrity of the Rome 
Statute on the International Criminal Court.  
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